

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 H-03 ACDA-19 IO-14 OIC-04 OMB-01

AEC-11 EB-11 DRC-01 /175 W  
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R 052003Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 859  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 10026

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY TO NATO DEPARTMENT TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM, NATO  
SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: STATEMENT BY POLISH REP AT MBFR  
PLENARY DEC 5

THE MBFR PLENARY ON DECEMBER 5 OPENED WITH A PREPARED STATEMENT  
GIVEN IN ENGLISH BY THE POLISH DELEGATE, MINISTER STRULAK  
(SUMMARIZED SEPTTEL). THE TEXT FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

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MR. CHARIMAN,  
DISTINGUISHED DELEGATES,

IT HAS BEEN ALMOST AMONTH SINCE THE DELEGATIONS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA,

GDR, SOVIET UNION AND MY OWN TABLED THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WHILE INTRODUCING THE DRAFT AND THEN IN THEIR CONSECUTIVE INTERVENTIONS THE SPONSORING DELEGATIONS HAVE ELABORATED ON ITS SPECIFIC PROVISIONS AND STRESSED THEIR DESIRE TO MAKE OUR DISCUSSION CONCRETE, CONDUCIVE TO RESULTS WHICH WOULD BE TANGIBLE FOR ALL PARTIES TO THE FUTURE AGREEMENT, FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL AS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION IN EUROPE, IN GENERAL.

THIS MOTIVATION BEHIND THE DRAFT HAS ALSO BEEN EMPHASIZED IN THE INTERVENTIONS BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVES OF BULGARIA AND HUNGARY AS WELL AS ROMANIA.

IT IS WITH THIS HIGH MOTIVE IN MIND THAT WE HAVE EVALUATED VIEWS AND PROPOSALS PRESENTED HERE BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

WE FIND IT COMMENDABLE TO REFER TO THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT ACHIEVED DURING THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS. THEY ARE OUR COMMON ACHIEVEMENT, AND NOT A SMALL ONE, A FOUNDATION ON WHICH WE ARE TO BUILD OUR AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT THE DOCUMENTS RECORDING THESE POINTS OF AGREEMENT - THE RECORD OF THE MEETING OF 14 MAY 1973 AND THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF 28 JUNE 1973 ARE THE RESULT OF LONG AND THOROUGH DELIBERATIONS. THE CAREFUL LANGUAGE OF THE DOCUMENTS REFLECTS WHAT IS COMMON IN THE POSITION OF ALL. IT DEFINES THE SCOPE OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. TRANSCENDING THAT SCOPE, OVER-EXTENDING THE SENSE OF PARTICULAR PROVISIONS BY MEANS OF SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION, MAKING EQUATIONS BETWEEN THE WORDING OF THE DOCUMENTS AND UNILATERAL POSITIONS WHICH HAVE NEVER BEEN JOINTLY ACCEPTED - ALL THIS, FAR FROM BRINGING US CLOSER TO AGREEMENT, ONLY COMPLICATES IT. THERE CAN BE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR A HOPE THAT WE MAY ACCEPT NOW WHAT WE FOUND UNACCEPTABLE BEFORE.

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TO BE MORE SPECIFIC, LET US TAKE THE AGREED OBJECTIVE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IS "TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE". WE FAIL TO SEE HOW AIMING AT A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD DENOTE THAT ONE FINDS ONESELF IN A SITUATION OF UNSTABLE RELATIONSHIP. RATHER, BY VIRTUE OF BOTH LOGIC AND GRAMMAR ONE SHOULD THINK THAT "MORE STABLE" IS THE COMPARATIVE DEGREE OF "STABLE".

I SUBMIT THAT THE IDEA OF INSTABILITY, SUPPOSEDLY CAUSED BY THE SO-CALLED DISPARITIES, WHICH FORMS THE BASIS FOR THE "OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS" OF THE SEVEN WESTERN DELEGATIONS, HAS NO RELATION TO EITHER THE SPIRIT OR THE LETTER OF THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF 28 JUNE 1973. BY THE WAY, MAY I REMARK THAT IT SEEMS TO BE MORE

IN LINE WITH A MISQUOTATION OF THE COMMUNIQUE IN A RECENT ARTICLE ON THE VIENNA TALKS PUBLISHED IN A KNOWN BRITISH PAPER, REFERRING TO "A MORE SUITABLE RELATIONSHIP", SUITABLE, UNDOUBTEDLY, FOR THE AUTHORS OF THE IDEA.

THE POLISH DELEGATION HAS ALREADY HAD AN OCCASION TO QUESTION THE VERY CONCEPT OF THE SO-CALLED DISPARITIES ADVANCED BY THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS, THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE CRITERIA APPLIED FOR SINGLING OUT THOSE DISPARITIES AS WELL AS THE USEFULNESS OF SUCH A METHOD FOR THE PROGRESS OF OUR TALKS. WE DO NOT WISH TO COMPETE IN UNILATERAL COMPARISONS WITH REGARD TO DISPARITIES EVEN THOUGH WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE STRENGTH OF DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE AREA. IT IS ON THE BASIS OF A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE THAT THE DRAFT AGREEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE FOUR DELEGATIONS PROCEEDS FROM THE ONLY REALISTIC PREMISE OF THE PREVAILING STABILITY. IT IS AIMED AT ENHANCING THIS STABILITY THROUGH LOWERING THE LEVEL OF CONFRONTATION WITHIN THE SECURE FRAMEWORK OF THE ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION. CONSEQUENTLY, IT FULLY CONFORMS TO THE GENERAL OBJECTIVE PROVIDED FOR IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE.

IN OUR LAST STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 13, 1973, I HAD AN OCCASION TO INDICATE HOW THE METHOD OF REDUCTION BY EQUAL PERCENTAGE FULLY CORRESPONDS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY WHICH IS THE KEY PRINCIPLE STATED IN THE DOCUMENTS OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS. IN YOUR INTERVENTION LAST WEDNESDAY, MR CHAIRMAN, SPEAK-  
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ING AS HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, YOU ELABORATED IN LENGTH ON THE EQUITY AND THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS METHOD. IT IS THEREFORE NOT WITHOUT SURPRISE THAT WE OBSERVE THIS VERY PRINCIPLE BEING USED TO JUSTIFY PROPOSALS FOR GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE REDUCTIONS TO BE CARRIED CLEARLY TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY OF SOME PARTIES. AGAIN, SUCH AN ARGUMENT HAS NO STANDING IN THE DOCUMENTS OF PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS.

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AEC-11 EB-11 DRC-01 /175 W

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R 052003Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 860  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 10026

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY TO NATO DEPARTMENT TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

REFERENCES HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE STIPULATION IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE ON THE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION. IN OUR VIEW THERE CAN BE NO TWO OPINIONS ABOUT THAT. THE PROBLEM IS A COMPLEX ONE. WE HAVE, IN CENTRAL EUROPE, A VARIETY OF COMPONENTS THAT MAKE FOR THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES. WE HAVE THERE VARIOUS FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ELEVEN STATES WHICH, AS WE HAVE AGREED, ARE TO BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTIONS. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM MUST BE MET WITH A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM. IT IS PRECISELY THIS APPROACH THAT UNDERLIES THE 4-POWER DRAFT AND IT HAS BEEN MORE THAN ONCE STRESSED AND ELABORATED UPON BY CONFIDENTIAL

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ITS SPONSORS.

BUT WE CANNOT FOLLOW AND ACCEPT A LOGIC WHEREBY THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM REQUIRES THAT ONLY ISOLATED ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE AREA BE REDUCED, WHILE OTHER ARE LEFT INTACT OR EVEN ALLOWED TO GROW. SUCH IS, WE REGRET TO SAY, THE SELECTIVE APPROACH IN THE PROPOSALS OF THE SEVEN POWERS AND IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SELECTION IS MADE WITH A VIEW TO OBTAINING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES. THUS, LAND FORCES AND TANKS ARE SINGLED OUT FOR REDUCTIONS WHILE THE AIR FORCE AND NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS ARE SIMPLY BY-PASSED AND LEFT OUT. SUCH AN APPROACH, INDEED, DOES NOT CONFORM WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE

CONCERNING THE COMPLEXITY OF REDUCTION PROBLEMS. IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT ANSWER THE CONCERNS WHICH MY COUNTRY AS WELL AS POLAND'S ALLIES DO HAVE ABOUT THE CONCENTRATION OF THE MOST DEADLY WEAPON SYSTEMS IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE. A REDUCTION PROGRAMME THAT DOES NOT ADDRESS ITSELF TO THESE CRUCIAL ISSUES IS ESSENTIALLY DEFICIENT.

THE LINE OF PARTIAL SELECTION OF ISOLATED ISSUES AND ASPECTS FROM THE ACTUALLY COMPLEX SUBJECT OF REDUCTIONS IS CLEARLY NOTICE-ABLE IN THE WESTERN "OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS" WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES. IT IS NOT ONLY THAT THE PROPOSED LIMITATION OF REDUCTION TO SOVIET AND US FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE IS HIGHLY UNEQUITABLE IN PROPORTION TO THE EXIST-ING RELATIONSHIP OF THE TWO RESPECTIVE POTENTIALS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION. IT IS NOT ONLY THAT THE ENVISAGED UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO THE NATO STATES IS FURTHER ACCENTUATED BY THE SUGGESTED DIFFERENCE IN THE METHOD OF WITHDRAWAL BETWEEN SOVIET AND US FORCES.

IT IS, ABOVE ALL, THAT THE REDUCTION OF OTHER WESTERN FORCES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING THE NATIONAL FORCES WHICH CONSTITUTE A MAJOR PART OF THE NATO POTENTIAL AND LARGELY EXCEED US FORCES, IS PRACTICALLY RELEGATED TO SOME DISTANT FUTURE. A TIMETABLE FOR SUCH REDUCTION IS NOT EVEN MENTIONED. THE POSSIBLE SIZE OF THE REDUCTION APPEARS INFINITESIMAL AND EVEN MORE SO WHEN COMPARED TO THE SUGGESTED SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

THE UNEQUITABLE AND UNPRECISE CHARACTER OF THE WESTERN PRO-CONFIDENTIAL

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GRAMME IS PARTICULARLY STRIKING WHEN COMPARED WITH THE CLEARCUT SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS, COMPRISED OF THREE CONSECUTIVE STAGES, TO BE CARRIED OUT WITH CUMULATIVE EFFECT WITHIN THE PERIOD OF THREE YEARS BEGINNING IN 1975, AND TO AFFECT PROPORTIONATELY ALL FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE AGREED AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE.

WE FAIL TO UNDERSTAND ALL THE RELUCTANCE OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO ENCOMPASS NATIONAL AND NON-AMERICAN STATIONED FORCES BY THE REDUCTION MEASURES. ONE MAY ASK: ARE THERE ANY REALLY VALID MILITARY, POLITICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVES OR BARRIERS? ARE WE TO RELATE THIS POSTURE TO THE REPEATED CONDITION THAT THE INTEGRATION TREND IN WESTERN EUROPE HAS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS? ARE WE EXPECTED TO SEE IN IT THE POSITIVE INFLUENCE THAT THIS TREND, WE ARE ASSURED, IS TO HAVE ON THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IN EUROPE?

WE HAVE ALREADY MADE CLEAR OUR VIVID INTEREST IN THE SUCCESS OF THESE TALKS, OUR DESIRE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE PRINCIPAL MOTIVE IN OUR POSITION HERE IS TO CONTRIBUTE, THROUGH MILITARY DETENTE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF POLITICAL SITUATION ON OUR CONTINENT, TO MAKE DETENTE A STABLE FACTOR OF POLITICAL LIFE, TO ENSURE TO ALL NATIONS THE BENEFITS OF A COMPREHENSIVE MUTUAL COOPERATION IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF EVER-GROWING SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE.

FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS GOAL IT IS NECESSARY FOR ALL TO SHOW THEIR GOOD WILL NOT ONLY BY WORDS BUT BY DEEDS AS WELL. IT IS NECESSARY TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE UNDERSTANDING WHICH IS ALREADY OBTAINED AND WHICH DEFINES THE GROUP OF ELEVEN STATES THAT ARE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE REDUCTION. CIRCUMSCRIBING THIS UNDERSTANDING IN ANY OF ITS PARTS OR STRESSING REDUCTION OF THE FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ONLY SOME PARTIES WILL NOT BE PRODUCTIVE FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS. NEITHER CAN IT BE SO FOR STRENGTHENING THE DETENTE AND BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE. FOR THIS IS AN ATTITUDE WHICH MAKES REDUCTION FRAGMENTARY AND AIMS AT INFRINGING UPON THE ACTUAL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES. AT THE SAME TIME IT WOULD NOT PREVENT AN INTENSIFICATION OF MILITARY EFFORT BY SOME OF THE PARTIES WHOSE POTENTIAL WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED. IT MAY EVEN LEAD TO A SORT OF EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS RACE, THE DEVELOPMENT THAT CAN  
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HARDLY HELP IMPROVE POLITICAL CLIMATE ON OUR CONTINENT.

THESE ARE NOT INVENTED MISGIVINGS OF OURS. IN ARTICLE 6 OF OUR DRAFT WE HAVE INCLUDED - AS A MOST NATURAL COROLLARY TO A BONA FIDE REDUCTION AGREEMENT AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT MATTER - AN UNDERTAKING BY THE PARTIES NOT TO INCREASE IN ANY WAY MANPOWER, ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT OF BOTH FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. WE REGRET TO SAY THAT WE HAVE AS YET FOUND NO POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL ON THE PART OF WESTERN DELEGATIONS.

ONCE AGAIN WE SHOULD LIKE TO REITERATE OUR FIRM VIEW CONCERNING THE NEED TO START AND CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN A WAY WHICH WILL BE CONVINCING OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS, I.E. TO COMPREHEND IN AN EQUAL DEGREE ALL MAJOR KINDS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

MR CHAIRMAN,

WE THOUGHT IT PROPER TO RE-EMPHASIZE CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE POSITION OF OUR COUNTRY, WHICH WE SHARE WITH THE OTHER THREE CO-SPONSORS OF OUR DRAFT REDUCTION AGREEMENT, AND IN THE LIGHT OF THIS DRAFT TO GIVE A CLEAR ASSESSMENT OF SOME VIEWS AND PROPOSALS OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS.

WE FELT OBLIGED TO PRESENT OUR FRANK EVALUATION OF CONCEPT WHICH WE CANNOT CONSIDER PRODUCTIVE OF CONDUCTIVE TO AGREEMENT. WE MADE THESE OBSERVATIONS IN ORDER TO HELP OBTAIN A CLARITY OF THE PERSPECTIVE IN OUR TALKS.

WHILE DOING SO WE REMAIN READY TO CONTINUE SEARCHING FOR WAYS WHICH MAY BRING US CLOSER TO AGREEMENT THAT WOULD BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE, THAT WOULD NOT RESULT IN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES OR DIMINISHED SECURITY OF ANY OF THE PARTIES. END TEXT  
HUMES

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## Message Attributes

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